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ABSTRACT:  Theist and critic alike typically assume rather traditional, Medieval, 
understandings of God, thereby masking certain complexities in their disputes. Drawing on the 
practices of both scientific and theological theory construction, it is argued that traditional 
theologies should be seen as negotiable in certain ways. In the light of this, standard attempts 
at refutations of Christianity have significantly less force than is usually appreciated. Some 
pitfalls of both strong and weak commitments to any particular theological framework are 
discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Virtues and Theological Construction* 
 In his presidential address to the Society of Christian Philosophers, Alvin Plantinga gave 
the advice that Christian philosophers should, at least some of the time, address issues that are 
important to those within the Christian community, whether or not those issues are important 
to those outside of that community.1  In this paper I will address issues that concern Christians 
and non-Christians alike. I motivate and provide a rationale for a particular perspective on and 
an attitude toward the theological enterprise, drawing on the philosophy of science. This 
attitude points the Christian community toward a strategy for coping with both internal 
disagreement and external criticism. This perspective bears on the question: “How much stock 
should we have invested in traditional theology?” 
 
I 
Occasionally someone tries to disprove the existence of God with the intent of undermining 
traditional belief and practice. One way to succeed in this task is to show that the divine 
attributes cannot be exemplified. If no being could exemplify this set of attributes, then God 
could not exist and by implication, God does not exist. Showing this requires some 
determinate set of attributes that are supposed to characterise God. Western theists typically 
ascribe omnipotence to God. So, if there is an unsolvable paradox of omnipotence, for 
instance, no being could be the way theists say God is. In response, theists typically try to 
dissolve any appearance of paradox and demonstrate not only that it is possible for someone to 
be omnipotent, but that a being can jointly possess all of the standard divine attributes. 
 Alternatively, a critic might argue that there is inconsistency in the joint supposition that 
God exists and that the world is the way it happens to be. In Mackie’s classic paper, the fact of 
evil is presented as something incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, 
and wholly good God.2  Adherents of some religious traditions, perhaps, can embrace such an 
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inconsistency and use it, in conjunction with the (presumably justified) belief in such a God as 
sufficient reason for denying the existence of evil. This strategy, however, is not open to 
Christians. If there is no evil, then there is no sin and if there is no sin, then there is no need 
for redemption, forgiveness, and grace. If there is no need for these, then much of Christian 
thinking about the person and work of Jesus is misguided at best. Christians, then, cannot in 
good conscience allow that evil is incompatible with the existence of God. Thus, various 
defenses and theodicies have been proposed to show at least the compatibility of the existence 
of God and evil. 
 In these debates, theist and critic alike assume traditional understandings of God. Theists 
seem to assume that revising one’s account of God’s nature exhibits intellectual laziness and a 
lack of religious tenacity. Critics seem to assume that revising one’s account of God is having 
one’s cake and eating it too. In this paper I will argue that too little attention has been given to 
the dialectical option of relinquishing traditional theological doctrines as part of the process of 
finding a more suitable theological package. I will  not argue that traditional theology is in fact 
inferior to alternatives or even that there presently is a pressing need to search for alternatives. 
I intend only to expose several reasons for thinking that traditional theology is negotiable in 
certain ways and that the failure to recognise this masks certain complexities in disputes 
between theist and critic. In short, aligning Christian theology with certain Medieval doctrines 
has sometimes had the effect of making refutations of Christianity appear much easier than 
they really are. In section II I will bring  to bear on the enterprise of theology construction 
some general issues regarding theory construction and evaluation. In section III I will cite 
reasons from within the practice of constructing Christian theology that warrant a somewhat 
loose commitment to philosophical formulations or explanations of elements of Christian 
belief. In section IV I will return to typical atheological strategies, such as attempts to refute 
Christian theism via paradox or conflict with our experience of evil, and suggest that they are 
limited in value in the light of a looser commitment to traditional theology. In section V I will 
discuss some pitfalls of both strong and weak commitment to any particular theological 
framework. 
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II 
By ‘traditional theology’ I understand philosophical statements of doctrines and explanations 
of these doctrines that come to us from the early Church Fathers and the Medieval doctors. 
This theology emphasises God’s absolute perfection, infinite power and knowledge, and 
complete unchangeableness. Two paradigm examples of traditional theologians are Augustine 
and Aquinas. In more general terms traditional theology is a general theory or, better, a family 
of closely-related  theories about the nature of God, humanity, and some of the important 
dealings between them. Many of those involved in the recent resurgence of philosophical 
theology count themselves as (relatively) theologically conservative and traditional theology 
enjoys a central place in their thinking about the nature of God, the human condition, and the 
Gospel. Many deem misguided “Bultmann’s” project of demythologising the New Testament 
in order to square it with a secular framework and, thus, make the Christian faith credible in 
“this age of electric light and the wireless.”3  Many would argue that demythologised 
Christianity cannot make sense of typical Christian practices and is unrecognizable as the faith 
of the Church. Hence, whatever it is, they say, it is not a proper theory of the Christian 
religion. 
 The process of theory construction provides a framework for recognising the negotiability 
of traditional theology because traditional theology is not the only theory. Church history is 
rife with debates over many issues of belief and practice. If we take seriously the distinction 
between truth and falsity, accuracy and error, then failed religious theories are no more 
surprising than failed physical theories. Why, then, is the commitment to traditional theology 
so strong in some circles that it provides a basis for acrimonious ecclesiastical debate and 
division and (as I will argue below) makes the defense of Christian theism more difficult?4   
Perhaps because it is deemed the only acceptable general Christian theory. Though I will not 
argue to the contrary here, let us turn our attention briefly to what makes a theology 
acceptable. 
 Good theology construction, like any good theory construction, is the attempt to reach a 
consistent theory that possesses an optimal balance of explanatory power, informational 
content, simplicity, and perhaps other theoretical virtues. These virtues can sometimes pull in 
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different directions so that a gain in power and content may involve a loss of simplicity. A 
gain in simplicity may force us to leave certain data unaccounted for or may force us to deem 
certain observations inaccurate or certain beliefs false. These general theoretical virtues 
provide our first reason for entertaining the prospect of relinquishing  traditional theology 
because they provide no simple, straightforward, algorithm for constructing an adequate 
theory. They do not entail, for instance, that there is a uniquely adequate theory. The concept 
of an optimal theory permits different realizations because two theories may reach the same 
balance of theoretical virtues in different ways. One might be heavy on explanatory power, but 
light on simplicity; another heavy on informational content and light on power. Even if there is 
some absolute minimum level of justification any theory must possess before it is 
intellectually respectable, there may be a multiplicity of theories that are equally above this 
minimum threshold, with no competitor placed above them. 
 If more than one religious theory can, in principle, reach the same degree of theoretical 
virtues, we must entertain the possibility of some non-traditional theological theory about the 
nature of God and God’s plan for humanity that is at least as good as traditional theology. 
There might be well-informed readings of the Biblical texts that undermine the claim that God 
is immutable, simple, or in possession of knowledge of counterfactuals of human freedom. 
Philosophical considerations might warrant the claim that God is not, after all, omnipotent. A 
priori there is no reason to think that an Augustinian conception of sin and redemption or a 
Thomistic conception of God is the only one that can be incorporated under the umbrella of 
acceptable Christian theologies. To a certain extent we recognise these possibilities when the 
doctrines in question are not those that have found their way into the historic creeds of the 
Church.  However, these general remarks apply to creedal statements as well as to later 
theological developments.5 
 The second reason for the negotiability of traditional theology derives from the process of 
evaluating exiting competing theories. Apparently Jesus claimed to be the God of Old 
Testament history.6  One way to understand this is in terms of Jesus and YHWH being one 
substance, but there are others. Jesus is supposed by many to be divine in order to explain his 
power to work miracles, teach perceptively, obey God perfectly, and secure our salvation. 
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Many within the Christian community proclaim that so-called cults not worthy of the title 
‘Christian’ typically deny that Jesus is any more divine than we are or will be. Such a denial of 
Jesus’ divinity certainly makes the resultant theory non-traditional, but determining whether 
this makes it unacceptable requires an examination of the entire alternative theoretical package 
rather than just a single component. A “cultish” theory departs from tradition in some ways, 
but it does not follow that it is thereby less satisfactory overall. It may realise theoretical 
virtues at least as well as typical members of the family of traditional theories that we received 
from the scholastics. 
 When assessing whether it is rational for an agent to hold a certain belief or theory, appeal 
to the truth of the belief is not particularly useful. What is useful, among other things, is the 
justification the agent possesses for holding that belief in those circumstances. Acceptability is 
sometimes at least as important as truth, since justification is our guide to the truth. Certainly 
we might be in the unfortunate circumstance of being justified in believing what is false. 
Sensible theories of truth and rationality admit this possibility. Nonetheless, from the “inside,” 
our only way to evaluate what, if anything, we ought to believe in our circumstances is to look 
at the justification we possess for our beliefs.7  There may be more than one theory we are 
(most) justified in believing. Thus, the complexities of constructing an optimal theory lead us 
to the complexities of assessing theories with the same consequence for treating traditional 
theology. 
 The question I raise at this point, whether there is a uniquely acceptable way to construct 
an optimal Christian religious theory, must be distinguished sharply from the question of 
whether a unique theory is true. I am concerned here not with the truth of a theory, but with 
the acceptability or justification of a theory. Nothing I have said so far shows that truth is 
unimportant, that truth makes no difference, that incompatible theories can all be true, or 
anything else of the kind. Truth, however, is not always the only thing that matters. 
 Our third general reason for a loosened grip on traditional theology comes from the 
possibility of theoretical progress.  Theoreticians, be they physicists or theologians, hope to 
make progress. This may be achieved either by the further application of a general program to 
new situations and new problems or it  may be achieved by the revision of older theories and 
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even the wholesale replacement of the old by the new. Theologians engaged in original 
theological research do so, presumably, in the hope of making theological progress, some of 
which involves improving on what has gone before. Those who think that Augustine and 
Aquinas made theological progress are likely to think that they made progress precisely 
because they replaced old, less adequate theories with newer more adequate theories. On the 
modest assumption that traditional theology is not perfect, the possibility and hope of making 
theological progress by replacement justifies a less-than-complete commitment to traditional 
theology. 
 Thus, the nature of general theoretical virtues, the assessment of an array of theories, and 
the possibility of theoretical progress partially warrant the recommendation that we should not 
be too wedded to traditional theology. Since traditional theology is a family of closely-related 
theories about God and the world, it is possible for other theories to score at least as well on 
the index of theoretical virtues, thereby being at least as acceptable as the bequest of tradition. 
If we attempt to choose rationally between competing theories, we must limit ourselves to 
justification for our beliefs which is transparent to us at the time of choosing. This may 
underdetermine our theory choice. We might be no less justified in believing a competitor. If 
so, we may hope to improve on the theological theory we currently possess, which may 
involve relinquishing some traditional ideas. 
 
III 
I turn now to the task of constructing an acceptable Christian theory. In this section I shall 
argue that the relation between Biblical hermeneutics and theology provides two further 
elements of support for the negotiability of the traditional theological framework and that the 
philosophical background of traditional theology provides another. 
 Among classical Christian doctrines are those about the nature of God: divine 
omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, simplicity, etc. Beyond strictly theistic doctrines 
there are peculiarly Christian doctrines regarding God as a Triune being, one person of which 
became incarnate in the historical person of Jesus. Doctrines that pertain to the relationship 
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between God and humanity are those of original sin, forgiveness and redemption by grace, and 
atonement by the death and resurrection of Jesus. 
 Chief sources of these doctrines are Biblical texts, Church history, and philosophical 
reflection. Surely one requirement of an acceptable Christian theology is that it faithfully 
systematise and explain the recorded experiences of the people who figure in the Bible, as well 
as the experiences of later Christians. However, no student of the Bible can be unaware that 
Biblical interpretation is, at times, rather dicey. For the major Western theistic doctrines there 
are passages of the Bible that lend support. The Psalmist regularly speaks of God as one of 
majestic power from whom all worldly power derives and in whom perfect righteousness is 
found. God is said to know our very thoughts, to be so reliable as to warrant our complete 
trust, and to be beyond the limitations of spacetime. 
 What do we make of such passages?  While they certainly constitute part of the Christian 
religious heritage, Biblical assertions do not even apparently take us all the way to the 
doctrines of omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, and simplicity. The Bible does not 
unambiguously assert that God is omnipotent, a being not only of actually unsurpassed power 
but also of unsurpassable power. Nor does it clearly assert that God is a being of not only 
unsurpassed knowledge but also of unsurpassable knowledge8or an immutable being eternally 
unable to change or be affected from without.9  So, first of all, taking the Bible seriously does 
not commit us to these sophisticated doctrines in philosophical theology. 
 Secondly, Biblical interpretation is just a special case of theory construction of the sort 
mentioned above and, thus, subject to revision. Competent interpreters pursue an interpretation 
of the whole Bible that does justice to each part while rendering the whole consistent and 
intelligible whenever possible, set within the framework of other things the interpreter 
believes. One might hope that this involves simply taking each passage at its face value.10  
Face value, though, is elusive. It is elusive because, unlike reading yesterday’s newspaper, 
reading the Bible is reading a collection of ostensibly historical accounts, liturgical songs of 
praise and confession, exhortations to change the ways of society, and instructions in faith and 
practice. Many statements seem to involve straightforward declarative sentences while others 
contain obvious uses of metaphor and poetic license. If these are the extremes, then there are 
 8 
many statements that fall into the category of the doubtful, i.e., the category of statements that 
are not obviously metaphorical and not obviously non-metaphorical. Determining how to treat 
these statements is a chief concern of the interpreter. 
 Face value is elusive also because none of the passages were addressed to us; they were 
addressed to people of different cultures, of different historical contexts, and with different 
sets of religious and moral questions. Sacrificing the first born to Baal was a live option for the 
Patriarchs, but not for us. The structure of a just system of political representation is a live 
issue for us, but was not for the New Testament Church. Sometimes the precise questions 
being addressed by Biblical writers can be inferred only indirectly and tentatively. Yet, 
knowing exactly what was at issue for that writer makes a significant difference to the way we 
interpret various passages as well as to the way we evaluate that writer. If the Apostle Paul 
was making certain assertions in response to a given situation, his injunction that wives must 
submit to their husbands while husbands must love their wives is difficult to take seriously in 
an age sensitised by feminism and his remarks make him appear rather sexist. If Paul asserted 
different propositions with those same words in response to a different situation, then his 
teaching would be a great deal easier to take and he would not appear sexist. 
 To the extent that textual comparison and historical investigation involve issues that are 
not easily resolved because we lack important information and because conclusions thereon 
are revisable in the light of further textual and historical research, the theological 
superstructure resting upon them is likewise revisable. Reasons of historical and linguistic 
distance from the Old and New Testament writers make our best current interpretations of 
these texts subject to future revision. Thus, the practice of Biblical hermeneutics, which serves 
as a basis for theological affirmations, provides another reason for being wary of identifying 
some portions of traditional theology with what is acceptable Christian theology.  
 The philosophical background of traditional theology also undermines wholesale devotion 
to traditional theology. This background is quite pervasive. Hermeneutics is not logically or 
historically prior to the philosophical aspects of theology. Part of what the interpreter does, if 
at all sympathetic, is find the renderings of the text that are fairly plausible. Even in books like 
the Bible, which apparently assert what some modern readers find ludicrous, a proper 
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interpretation requires that in at least the “non-fantastic” portions, the writer should be taken 
as asserting something sensible. A reader’s idea of what is sensible, however, will be subject 
to what that reader has reason to believe. Part of what the reader has reason to believe involves 
certain philosophically-loaded beliefs about the structure of the cosmos and good and evil. The 
philosophically relevant information we get out of a text is subject to the philosophically 
relevant material we bring to the text when we read it for what is sensible and what is not. As 
with the historical foundations of interpretation, the philosophical and theological assumptions 
of the readers affect what they can “read off” the pages of the Bible for the purposes of self-
consciously constructing a theory about the nature of God. 
 This factor makes the processes of interpretation and theory construction a context-relative 
matter. Some erroneously take the dependence of the reasonableness of doctrine on factors 
like context and prior assumptions to warrant the rather distinct claim that the truth or 
applicability of such doctrines is likewise dependent or relative. Many non-academic believers 
are reluctant to admit to such relativities for fear of the (supposed) ensuing relativism about 
the nature of God or the way of salvation. Yet, God’s nature may be as objectively determinate 
as one likes while it is still true that what, in part, explains why it occurs to me that God is 
omnipotent are certain powerful historically- and contextually-relative matters. While God 
may, indeed, have a certain highly specific nature I may, for any number of reasons, be in a 
poor position to have much confidence that I have understood that nature. The fact that I am 
unlikely to perceive God’s hand in history unless I work with a theory in which God’s activity 
is both possible and discernible makes it no less true (or false) that God has indeed worked at 
some particular point in history. Likewise, one can sensibly affirm that Jesus either is the 
second person of the Trinity or he is not, while also affirming that the plausibility of the 
divinity of Jesus is subject to factors of the relative justification of other beliefs. As a specific 
application of the general features of theory construction and theory choice, the issue is one of 
our relative certainty about such doctrines and what turns on them. It is not an issue of what is 
true; it is a matter of what we have sufficient justification for believing to be true. Such can be 
said for many affirmations and is certainly not peculiar to theological affirmations. 
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 Applying these ideas to our present concern suggests that we should scrutinise the 
philosophical background of traditional theological claims. The theologians who formulated 
many of these doctrines were in the grip of certain philosophical programs. Augustine’s 
theology was heavily influenced by his contact with Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism as it 
came to him in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries. If it can be shown that his thinking about sin 
and redemption is inordinately affected by the philosophically-motivated view that matter is 
intrinsically evil and spirit is intrinsically good and if it can be further shown that the best 
rendering of the Bible gives a view of body and spirit that is incompatible with this, then there 
is at least one reason to think that Augustine’s views are negotiable. Perhaps a rather different 
view, even one advocated by others in early Church history, might be a better part of our 
overall theological package.11 
 Along similar lines, it is a commonplace that Aquinas’ theological project was to reconcile 
the two dominant sources of truth as he saw them: the Bible and the corpus of Aristotle. In 
light of the gap between the Biblical affirmations about the character of God and the Medieval 
doctrines of the divine attributes, perhaps we should carefully examine the extent to which the 
Thomistic views are a function of Aristotle’s doctrines of perfection, actuality, and 
changelessness rather than prior Christian teaching and practice. If Aristotle’s Unmoved 
Mover is not a God who can love, be moved by the prayers of the faithful, or act in history and 
if the God of the Old and New Testaments can and does, then this is good reason to be 
skeptical that Aquinas’s project will be fruitful. What was reasonable for him to trust is not for 
us. We no longer think of the corpus of Aristotle as one of the factors with which we must 
reconcile Christian teaching. So, there is no overriding reason to make our theology acceptable 
to an Aristotelian. We are free to take or leave the framework of Aristotle as best suits our 
other theological purposes, especially when the issues before us are rather different on the 
front of metaphysics, science, and ethics. We should, therefore, at least be willing to consider 
the possibility that the old frameworks, as reasonable as they were for their advocates and as 
instructive as they may be for us now, are hindrances to progress in understanding the nature, 
ways, and intentions of God. While the fact that Augustine and Aquinas were influenced by 
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secular philosophical ideas does not entail that the resulting theologies are faulty, it is at least 
reason to seriously consider the adequacy of those ideas and the relevant theologies. 
 What is true of Augustine’s and Aquinas’s models is true quite generally. To the extent 
that a model is formulated in terms of a negotiable theoretical framework, the resultant model 
is negotiable. To the extent that Augustine and Aquinas formulated their ideas about God in 
terms of then-contemporary ideas heavily influenced by Plotinus and Aristotle, and to the 
extent that Plotinus’s and Aristotle’s philosophical assumptions are not part of, or even 
strongly suggested by, the basic Christian data, the theologies built by Augustine and Aquinas 
are optional. To the extent that they are optional, we should not invest a great deal of stock in 
them. 
 Thus, the practice of Christian theology provides several reasons to warrant reluctance in 
uncritically adopting traditional theology and branding as heretics those who choose another 
general framework within which to “work out [their] salvation with fear and trembling.”  
These reasons concern the possibility of theological progress, the process of hermeneutics, and 
the philosophical presuppositions of traditional theology. These reasons, however, do not yield 
the verdict that working out the details of the traditional theological program is misguided. On 
the contrary, such effort might well bear fruit and bring greater understanding. ‘Traditional’ 
does not mean discredited;  ‘new’ does not mean worthy of consideration. I mean to suggest 
only that we are well-advised to consider whether some of the problems that confront 
contemporary philosophical theologians are merely artifacts of the philosophical context in 
which the original doctrines were formed. If immutability and simplicity are completely a 
function of Aristotle and none of the Bible, then perhaps there are theological problems that 
Aquinas needed to address, given his project, that we are under no obligation to resolve. It is 
permissible for us to leave them as historical artifacts to be learned from, but not to worry 
about. 
 
IV 
Let us now return to the issues with which we began. Given the perspective on theology 
defended here we can begin to see how a rigid adherence to traditional theology oversimplifies 
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the issues between the theist and the critic and that typical arguments that purport to show the 
falsity of theism in general, or Christianity in particular, are misguided. Theist and critic alike 
mistake certain negotiable elements of thinking about God for the essence of religious 
thinking. 
 A critic alleges that there is a paradox of omnipotence. So what?  Unless it is crystal clear 
that Christianity requires that God is omnipotent rather than merely almighty, that God is a 
being of unsurpassable power rather than of merely great unsurpassed power, then no central 
tenet of Christianity is thereby refuted. If the doctrine of omnipotence is not demanded by a 
serious treatment of the Bible and later Christian experience, and if its source is something like 
an Aristotelian concept of perfection, then perhaps Christian thinkers can, in good conscience, 
respond to the paradox by giving up but not giving in. They can admit that while no being can 
be omnipotent, God need not be omnipotent anyway. If so, then not only is Christianity not 
refuted by the paradox, Christian thinkers could thank the critic for enabling them to make 
theological progress. If God need not be omnipotent to perform the actions commonly 
attributed to God by Christians, e.g., God need not be omnipotent to be the creator of the 
world, the sender of Jesus, and the healer of Paul, then the critic has inadvertently brought 
greater understanding to the Christian community about the nature of God and, perhaps, about 
God’s relation to humanity. 
 Even if Christianity really requires that God is omnipotent and paradox strikes at the heart 
of Christian theology, again, what of it?  Christianity is refuted, but, for all the paradoxes of 
omnipotence purport to show, there may still be a triune creator of the physical world who has 
repeatedly interrupted the natural flow of history to accomplish goals that otherwise would not 
have been. Jesus might still be the incarnate(d) member of that triune being. Christianity is 
refuted, but something so close to it stands untouched that no self-respecting atheist should 
think that the paradox facilitates any kind of irreligion. The greatest possible success of any 
paradox of omnipotence is really rather minimal. Its proper impact on the life of the ordinary 
believer and its significance to the atheist who believes in only atoms and the void is the same: 
nil. 
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 Likewise for the problem of evil. Unless some fairly specific ascriptions regarding divine 
power, knowledge, and moral perfection are essential elements of Christian theology, the 
problem cannot even arise. But, even if these ascriptions are essential and all defenses and 
theodicies are doomed to failure, then  Mackie was right all along, but what of it?  First, our 
theology would need to be re-cast. Either the one called ‘God’ is not the perfect being we 
thought, or being a perfect being is not what we thought. What is the harm in being pushed to 
this conclusion?  Divine omnipotence and omniscience are underdetermined by Biblical data. 
Much of our textual evidence for these doctrines comes from places that could easily be read 
as passages given to rhetorical flourishes that are intended not as sober statements of 
theological doctrines but as inspirational tools that might serve to encourage the dispossessed, 
strengthen the weak, and fortify the wavering. 
 Second, those that sympathise with Mackie should not be encouraged too quickly with 
such a victory. If a position is contradictory, then that position is most assuredly false. But, in 
the case of Christianity, the position is a complex position involving several propositions. At 
least one of these must be discarded in favor of its negation to yield a consistent set and 
consistency can be regained in ways that provide no comfort to the atheist. If God is not 
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good, there may still exist an extremely powerful being 
who created the physical universe ex nihilo, helped Moses part the Red Sea, spoke judgment 
through the Old Testament prophets and who was in Jesus Christ reconciling the world. Such a 
being must be one of great power, great (fore)knowledge, and remarkable moral character. 
This being would be worthy of devotion, gratitude, and worship. It would make sense to pray 
to such a being, seeking direction and forgiveness, offering repentance and sacrifice, giving 
praise and honor. In short, justified belief in the existence and actions of such a being still 
warrants the traditional Christian practices and is arguably compatible with an acceptable 
reading of the Old and New Testaments. Thus, what’s the problem with the problem of evil?12 
 The lesson to be learned in this section is that little or nothing crucial to the Christian faith, 
as it may well have been understood by its early practitioners, is lost by admitting that some 
traditional doctrines must, ultimately, find their end on a theological scrap heap. There could 
still be a God who creates, saves, hears and answers prayers, and bring the machinations of 
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fallen humanity to an end in a reign universal of peace. A robust atheism that warrants the 
neglect of religious practices is not even nearly exonerated. 
 Some might object that I have construed “traditional theology” too narrowly. Traditional 
theology  is not to be contrasted with non-Medieval approaches. It is, rather, to be contrasted 
with approaches that do not save the basic phenomena of Christian belief and practice just 
noted. Two remarks bear on this objection. First, if this is all traditional theologians and 
philosophers are concerned to defend, it is more than a bit surprising that the preponderance of 
the philosophical responses to the theological paradoxes and the problem of evil make no 
mention of the negotiability of the underlying theological doctrines. The doctrine of a finite 
God is commonly perceived as an unacceptable substitute for the more traditional doctrines of 
God. This is at least puzzling, if the practical phenomena were the only things at stake in 
philosophical debates over religious belief. Second, if this is what someone thinks is crucial to 
the practice of traditional theology, then I am in complete agreement. These considerations 
serve to show that a particular theological framework is not fundamental to Christian theology. 
The fundamentals are much less theory-laden and much more in touch with historical events 
than are systems meant to enable a fuller understanding of those events. What is crucial to 
Christian theology is not what I have been calling “traditional theology” but the more 
mundane historical claims about the activity of God and the experiences and practices of 
various people. Clearly, then, traditional theology is negotiable and typical atheological 
arguments are almost completely beside the point. 
 So, arguments that purport to show the falsity of theism in general, or Christianity in 
particular, are typically misguided. Even in the face of unanswered atheological arguments, 
one can sensibly and responsibly remain a Christian believer. Obviously, the crucial issues are 
left untouched by such arguments and an atheism thus defended is no atheism at all. This point 
has been obscured, in part, because some theists simply begin their discussions with the 
affirmation that God is omnipotent, omniscient, etc.13 This is simply given, without any 
indication that there is room for maneuvering on such claims. It is not surprising that critics 
follow suit, apparently oblivious to the permissible nuances.14  The debate over the existence 
of God is a good bit more complex and subtle than either side lets on. Ignoring this complexity 
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has made the atheist’s task of arguing for the non-existence of God too easy. It is much more 
difficult to prove atheism than successfully producing a paradox or the problem of evil. For 
this reason Christians should be much less interested in identifying acceptable theology with 
traditional philosophical theology than their critics. While adequate theistic arguments are not 
easy to come by, adequate atheistic arguments are at least as hard to come by.15 
 
V 
I will close with a brief discussion of the dangers of the various orientations toward 
theological orthodoxy and disclose some of my motivation for taking up these issues in these 
ways. Those wedded to orthodoxy are sometimes accused of being closed-minded and 
intolerant.16  Sometimes this is a fair criticism of those confident of their own orthodoxy. 
Intolerance, though, is not a necessary result of justified certainty of one’s correctness. My 
knowing the truth does not essentially involve my persecuting those in error. Christians, in 
particular, have good reasons to practice tolerance. According to them, God has proscribed 
revenge for the Christian community. So, being fully convinced of the truth of the Christian 
message is a powerful inducement to be, above all, tolerant of those that do not accept that 
message. If Jesus was not only tolerant but willing to suffer at the hands of those in error and 
Christians are called to imitate his example, then tolerance should be the result of a properly 
understood and implemented certainty of the Christian faith. I have argued not for a weak 
commitment to the Christian faith, but for a weak commitment to the somewhat more 
theoretical philosophical theologies that are sometimes closely identified with the faith itself. 
 In contrast, there are at least two genuine dangers of the apparently easy-going attitude 
about theoretical questions I have espoused in this paper. A believer is likely to raise the first 
concern. This attitude might lead one too easily to think that “anything goes” in theology. The 
danger is that over time the beliefs, practices, and institutions associated with the Church may 
have so little in common with what has been considered Christian for nearly two millennia that 
the essence of the faith will become lost. If there is anything to the faith to begin with, this is a 
genuine possibility. Though I will not attempt to specify exactly when one has gone beyond 
the pale, Christian thinkers should give serious attention to discerning the crucial phenomena 
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to be saved by any satisfactory Christian theology. Perhaps there is no unique set of 
phenomena and the phenomena one finds crucial may be wedded to the framework within 
which one chooses to work. This may be unavoidable, but confronting these issues may give 
us a clearer understanding of the proper task of philosophical theology. 
 A critic is likely to raise the second concern. If the theoretical structure of Christianity is 
so loose and subject to change, then what is the content of the religion?  Is there any cognitive 
significance to a religion which can be endlessly interpreted and revised that it may fit with 
any development in philosophy and science?  Yet, if there is a “hard core” to Christianity, then 
it is not endlessly revisable. Plausibly, if there is no God who is responsible for the existence 
of the world, no sin and no means of salvation for humanity, then the Christian tradition is 
sorely misguided. If God is only to what I (we) care most deeply about, then, indeed, there is 
no Christian God. In such circumstances, Christianity might still be good for something, but it 
would be no good for informing us of the nature of the world and our place in it. 
 The concerns of the believer and the critic go hand in hand and show that a significant 
project for research is to determine the hard core of Christianity. In the end, there may be no 
algorithm which yields the conditions of refutation for a sophisticated religious theory like 
Christianity and thinkers may well need to use their good sense in determining the conditions 
under which it stands and under which it falls. If so, as unsatisfying as this may be, it is no 
different from any other sophisticated theory of the world. Scientific theories are subject to 
precisely the same slipperiness.17 
 Finally, my motivation for taking up these issues in the ways I have. First, I am struck by 
the way in which current Christian practice seems to differ from that of the New Testament 
Church. Many segments of the contemporary Church place such a great deal of emphasis on 
details of theological affirmation that many Christians appear to have the impression that 
correct belief is essential for salvation. Going the wrong way on free will/predestination or 
transubstantiation/consubstantiation might have disastrous consequences for one’s soul, they 
fear. I do not suggest that this is an explicit portion of the beliefs of all, but a great deal of 
weight is placed on theological correctness. Specific teaching and instruction are certainly not 
absent from the Gospels and the Epistles, however it is fair to say that some of the doctrines 
 17 
that are the center of philosophical theological debates are those that are given no explicit New 
Testament formulation. There is some justification in a complaint of some critics: the 
Christian faith as we know it was invented by the early Church Councils. To be sure, the 
councils responsible for “inventing” noteworthy Christian doctrines did not work in a vacuum. 
They were aware of the Biblical data as well as the later experiences of the Church. The 
doctrines they handed us are a product of their efforts to best theorise about God and the 
world. My arguments suggest only that there might be other ways equally faithful to the 
Biblical texts and the experience of the Church. Salvation seems to be only tangentially a 
function of propositional assent. To be sure, one cannot have faith in God, if one doesn’t even 
so much as believe in God. One would be hard pressed, though, to argue successfully that 
belief in God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of human freedom is necessary for salvation. 
 My second, and most important, reason for pursuing these lines is a somewhat pastoral 
thread. Jesus prayed that his people would be united and that their unity might be a powerful 
component of their witness to the world of God’s grace and love.18  I have witnessed 
theological differences generate ill will at both the professional and the non-professional 
levels. Some seem to identify too closely with a particular reading of the Bible or a specific 
theory about the way God acts in history. Paul never mentions correct belief as one of the 
desirable fruits of the Spirit,19 but concern over correct belief (usually in others) has often led 
us to give these fruits a back seat to doctrinal correctness. According to the tradition, the 
Christian faith is by no means a game. If we take Christians at their word, it not only cost 
Jesus his life, but it also costs us ours. However, constructing an adequate theology is much 
closer to a game than we sometimes allow ourselves to admit. 
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God.  These more recent formulations of the problem of evil still rely on the same assumptions 
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